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72.04-1

[8. F. No. 17224. In Bank. Dec. 9, 1947.]

B. G. JOHNSTON, Respondent, v. BOARD OF' SUPERVISORS OF MARIN COUNTY et aI., Defendants and
Appellants; VITO B. ALIOTO, Intervener and Appellant.
[1] Appeal-Review-Questions Reviewable.-The objections that
there is a misjoinder of causes of action and a failure to statealleged causes of action separately, when not relied upon on
appeal, may be regarded as waived.
[2] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Legislative Acts.-A temporary injunction restraining a board of supervisors from
either publishing a local zoning ordinance or taking any steps
to bring such ordinance into effect interferes with the legislative action of such board, and is improper regardless of
whether its action would be valid.
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[3] Id.-Matters Controllable-Legislative Acts.-Assuming that
the contemplated action of a board of supervisors in effectuating a local zoning ordinance would be in excess of its jurisdiction, any authority that a court might have to enjoin such
action is qualified by the requirement that plaintiff show that
there is no other adequate remedy for the protection of his '
rights and that political rights would not be curtailed. Before
an injunction would be available in such case it would at least
be necessary for plaintiff to show that the passage of the
<

[2] Injunction against legislative body of state or municipality,
note, 140 A.L.R. 439. Sec, also, 14 Cal.Jur. 202; 28 Am.Jur. 366.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Arrcn] and Error, ~ 97(L [2, 3) Injunctions, § 19(1); [4-6, 8-11) Zonillg; [7] Statutes, § 180.
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ordinance, without any attempt to enforce it, would instantly
produce irreparable injury.
[4] Zoning-Ordinances-Variances.-The power to authorize a
variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance may be granted
to an ndministrative board without violating the principle
IIgainst the delegation of legislative powers.
[5J ld.-Powers of Legislative Body.-A board of supervisors has
no inherent power to grant a use permit, regardless of the
terms of a local zoning ordinance.
[6J ld.-Powers of Legislative Body.-When a board of supervisors acts in an administrative capacity, as in granting permits under a zoning ordinance, it is bound by the terms of the
oroinonce until it is amended through proper legislative procedure.
[7J Sta tutes-Construction-Contemporaneo1!s Construction.-The
rule of contemporaneous construction may not be applied when
the wording of the statute or ordinance clearly calls for a different construction.
IS] Zoning-Powers of Legislative Body.-A board of supervisors
cannot under Const., art. XI, § 11, adopt a zoning ordinance
conflicting with state legislation on the subject.
[9J ld.-Construction of Zoning Laws.-The State Planning Act
(Stats. ]929, p. 1805, as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
5211b) does not require a board of supervisors to reserve to
itself authority to grant a use permit, such as one to construct
and operate a fish cannery and reduction plant, regardless of
the decision of the local planning commission.
[10] ld.-Construction of Zoning Laws.-The State Planning Act,
§ 10, providing the procedure to be followed in certain matters
when final authority thereon is within the jurisdiction of some
body other than the planning commission, applies to action
taken by any local public body or officer, and applies to a
board of supervisors only if that body is the one having final
authority over the matter involved.
[l1J Id.-Remedies-Injunction.-A temporary injunction may issue to enjoin a board of supervisors from issuing a use permit
in violation of a zoning ordinance where the permit has been
denied by the planning commission in the exercise of its lawful authority, and this is true notwithstanding the fact that
the allegations of the complaint with respect to the offensive
nature of a proposed fish reduction plant may also be construed as allegations of a nuisance.
[4) Constitutionality of provisions of zoning statutes or ordinances authorizing the granting of variances, note, 86 A.L.R. 714.
See, also, 12 Cal.Jur. lO-Yr. Supp. 139.
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Marin
County granting an injunction pendente lite. Edward I.,
Butler, JUdge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
A. E. Bagshaw, District Attorney, Harold Jos. Haley,
Deputy District Attorney, and Natalie J. Holly for Defendants and Appellants.
George Olshausen for Intervener and Appellant.
Paul S. Marrin, Howard C. Ellis and Sterling Carr for
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J .-This action was brought by a resident and
taxpayer of Marin County to restrain the members of the
board of supervisors of that county from issuing to the
Benicia Food Products Company n use permit to construct
and operate a fish cannery and reduction plant within an
unincorporated part of the county. The plaintiff also sought
an injunction against the members of the board to restrain
them from adopting an ordinance that allegedly authorized
the construction and maintenance of the proposed plant in
this area. Defendants, the members -of-the"-OO81'd-uf -sup visors, and interveners, Benicia Food Products Company, and,
Vito B. Alioto, appeal from an order pendente lite enjoining
the issuance of the use permit and the enactment of the
ordinance.
The injunction was issued on the basis of plaintiff 's com~
plaint, the substance of which follows. The Benicia Food
Products Company filed an application with the Marin County
Planning Commission for a permit to construct and operate
a fish cannery and reduction plant in an unincorporated
part of Marin County, located about one mile from plaintiff's
residence. Plaintiff alleges that the operation of the pro-,
posed plant in that area would pollute the air with offensive'
odors and contaminate the waters surrounding plaintiff'.
property. Although the proposed site for the plant is in an,
area zoned for heavy industry, the local zoning ordinance:
(Ordinance 264 of Marin County) provides that a use permit'
must be obtained before any :fish reduction plant may be
constructed or operated in such area.
The commission held a hearing on the application for a
use permit, and Mrs. Natalie Holly, wife of R. A. Thompson,'
a member of the Marin County Board of Supervisors, appeared
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as attorney for the applicant. After the hearing, the commission voted to deny the application and transmitted its report
to the board of supervisors. The report was considered by
the board of supervisorS at a public meeting, at which Mrs.
Holly again represented the applicant. At this meeting, Supervisor Thompson submitted a proposed ordinance entitled,
"An ordinance ... regulating the establishment, maintenance
and operation of reduction plants ... and repealing all conflicting ordinances and parts of ordinances." Without submitting the proposed ordinance to the Marin County Planning Commission, the board then voted to adopt it by a vote
of three to two. Supervisor Thompson then made a motion
that the board reject the report of the planning commission
and grant the application of the Benicia Food Products Company for a use permit. This motion was likewise carried by
a vote of three to two. A supervisor voting against the proposed ordinance and against the use permit gave notice immediately after the vote on each measure that under parliamentary rules of order he elected to change his vote, and
made motions for reconsideration of each matter at the next
meeting.
Plainti1f filed the complaint before the next scheduled
meeting of the board of suMrvisors, and the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order and an order to show
cause why an injunction pendente lite should not be issued.
The ground on which plaintiff sought an injunction against
enactment of the proposed ordinance was that the ordinance
would be invalid because it was not submitted to the planning commission for a report as required by the provisions
of the State Planning Act (Stats. 1929, p. 1811, § 9, as
amended; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 5211b) and section 21, Ordinance 264 of Marin County. The injunction
restraining the board of supervisors from issuing the use
permit was sought on two grounds: (1) that under the provisions of ordinance 264, such a permit could be granted only
on affirmative action of both the planning commission and
the board of supervisors; and (2) that Supervisor Thompson
was disqualified from participating in any action that the
board of supervisors might take with respect to the application for a use permit.
The Benicia Food Products Company and Vito B. Alioto,
a part owner of the company, were joined as defendants
along with the members of the board of supervisors. The
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company, Alioto, and Supervisor Thompson, jointly filed 8
demurrer and an answer. The grounds of the demurrer
were that the complaint failed to state facts constituting Ii
cause of action; that the complaint contained a misjoinder
of two causes of action; and that two causes of action were
not separately stated. The other members of the board of
supervisors filed a general demurrer. The trial court dismissed the action as to the Benicia Food Products Company
and Alioto and granted them leave to appear as interveners.
They thereupon rested their opposition to the injunction on
the demurrer and answer previously filed. The demurrers
were overruled, and after hearing on the order to show cause,
the trial court issued an injunction pendente lite restraining
the members of the board of supervisors "from (a) issuing
or causing to be issued any Use Permit, or any permit, pursuant to the application of said Benicia Food Products Company, filed as set forth in the complaint on file nprein before
the Planning ComInission of the said County of Marin ...,
and (2) from publishing said purported Ordinance likewise
referred to in said complaint on file herein, or taking any
steps to bring said Ordinance into existence or effect. . .. "
Defendants and interveners, hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants, have appealed from this order on
the following grounds: (1) the injunction is erroneous in
that it restrains the board of supervisors from taking legislative action; (2) the board of supervisors had power to
issue the use permit in question after the denial thereof by
the planning commission; (3) Supervisor Thompson was not
disqualified from participating in any action with respect
to the issuance of the use permit; (4) the injunction is excessive in any event, because it enjoins the construction of a
fish cannery as a nuisance. [1] Defendants on appeal have
not relied on the alleged misjoinder of causes of action or
failure to state two alleged causes of action separately. Those
contentions may therefore be regarded as waived. (Title
O. & T. Co. v. Fraternal Finance Co., 220 Cal. 362, 363
f30 P.2d 515] ; Mayne v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 179 Cal.
173, 179 [175 P. 690].) In any event, if the complaint is
deficient in these respects, there is nothing to indicate that
defendants were in any way prejudiced thereby. (Cal. Const.,
art VI, § 4th; Tobin Grocery Co. v. l'f'Pry, 204 Cal. 247. 250
[267 P. 694] ; cases collected 2 Cal.Jur. 1010, § 601.)
[2] The contention that the injunction erroneously restrains legislative action by the board of supervisors is meri-
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torious. The temporary restraining order was issued after
action on the proposed ordinance was delayed by the motion
for reconsiueration. The temporary injunction pendente lite,
by ordering the board of superyisors to refrain from either
publishing the ordinance or taking any steps to bring such
ordiuance into effect, clearly interfered with the legislative
action of the legislative body of the county. Regardless of
whether the action of the board of supervisors would be
valid, such an injunction is not the proper remedy in this case.
[3] Plaintiff contends that there is an exception to the
general rule or judicial noninterference with the legislative
action of a county board of supervisors (Nickersen v. San
Bernardino Oounty, 179 Cal. 518, 522 [177 P. 465]; cases
collected 140 A.L.R. 439, 440) when the board is about to
adopt an ordinance in excess of its jurisdiction. (See Glide
v. Superior Oourt, 147 Cal. 21, 23 [81 P. 225].) Even if it
be assumed that the contemplated action would be in excess
of the board's jurisdiction in this case, any authority that
a court might have to enjoin such action is qualified by the
requirement that plaintiff show that there is no other adequate remedy for the protection of his rights and that political rights would not be curtailed. (See Harnett v. Oounty
of Sacramento, 195 Cal. 676, 683 [235 P. 445].) Before an
iujul1ction would be available to restrain legislative action
il; this case it would at least be necessary for plaintiff to
!Show that the passage of the ordinance without "any attempt to enforce it would instantly produce irreparable
injury." (6 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, 731.) Obviously, plaintiff cannot make such a showing, for if the ordinance is illegally enacted, he will have an adequate remedy
in his right to seek an injunction restraining its enforcement
or restraining anyone from building or operating a fish reduction plant pursuant to it.
The principal issue with respect to the validity of the
remainder of the injunction is whether the board of supervisors under Ordinance 264 of Marin County and under the
State Planning Act may issue a use permit after the Marin
County Planning Commission had denied an application
therefor.
The property in question was located in a district designated as an "M-2" or heavY industry zone by the master
plan of Marin County. Section 11.19 of the ordinance in
question provides that property in "M-2" zones may be used
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for •• All uses not otherwise prohibited by law j provided however, that none of the following uses shall be established in
any 'M-2' district unless and until a use permit in each case
shall first have been secured for such use: . . . Reduction,
canning, processing or treatment of fish or of animal products
of any kind."
Section 20 of the ordinance provides that use permits may
be issued for "Any of the uses or purposes for which such
permits are required or permitted by the provisions of this
ordinance. " This section also provides that, "Such permits
shall be issued under the same procedure as that specified
in Section 19 of this ordinance for the granting of adjustments or variances . . . I, with certain exceptions relating to
the conduct of hearings by the commission. Section 19 thus
contains the procedural provisions applicable to the granting of use permits under section 11.19 of the ordinance.
The first sentence of section 19 concerns the powers of
the board of supervisors and of the commission with respect
to adjustments and variances. The power to grant adjustments and variances, within strictly defined limits, is given
to the commission in the following .terms: "The Planning
Commission, subject to tke approval and confirmation of the
Board of Supervisors m-each-case~- as hereInafter provlded,skall kave tke power to grant adjustments and variances in
any of the provisions of the ordinance. . .. " (Italics added.)
This is not a procedural provision and therefore is not incorporated by reference into section 20. It should be noted,
however, that the sentence vests "the power to grant adjustments and variances" in the commission, subject to the approval and confirmation of the board of supervisors, and does
not reserve any authority in the board of supervisors to
grant adjustments and variances.
The pertinent procedural provisions of section 19 are 88
follows:
"Application for any adjustment or variance permissible
under the provisions of this section shall be made to the
Planning Commission in the form of a written application for
a building permit or for a permit to use the property or
premises as set forth in said application."
"The Commission shall make its decision on the said application and shall report such decision to the Board of
Supervisors. ' ,
.
" No permit skall be issued under the provisions of this
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section unless and until a decision of the Planning Commission, as aforesaid, approving the same, is approved and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors . . . . Upon receipts of
such report, if the decision of the Planning Commission
approved the granting of the application, the Board of Supervisors either shall, by resolution, approve and confirm said
decision, whereupon the permit as applied for may issue; or
shall refuse to approve and confirm said decision." (Italics
added.)
Section 19 thus expressly provides that no permit shall be
granted without the approval of the planning commission.
The board of supervisors is given power merely to approve
or refuse to approve the decision of the commission approving
the application for a permit; the board of supervisors is
given no authority over the application should the commission deny it. Since the only procedure for granting use
permits is that specified in section 19 for variances and
adjustments, it follows that the board of supervisors was not
authorized by the ordinance to take affirmative action on the
application for a use permit in the face of the disapproval
thereof by the planning commission.
[4] It is contended, however, that the board of supervisors has inherent power to grant a ¥Se permit, and that
any attempt to confer this power on the planning commission would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to a local administrative board. The general rule,
however, is that even the broader power to authorize a
variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance may be
granted to an administrative board without violating the
principle against the delegation of legislative powers.
(Freeman v. Board of Adjustment,97 Mont. 342, 354 [34
P.2d 534]; State v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 1242 [133
So. 114] ; L. &: M. Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12,
18 [180 N.E. 379, 86 A.L.R. 707] McCord v. Ed Bond &:
Condon Co., 175 Ga. 667 [165 S.E. 590, 591, 86 A.L.R.
703]; cases collected 86 A.L.R. 714.) The action of the
planning commission in denying a use permit is wholly administrative. There is no more delegation of legislative authority in this case than is normally involved in vesting
administrative officers with authority to grant or deny a
permit pursuant to a local ordinance. (See Gaylord v.
City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 436 [166 P. 348]; Gould
v. Western Dairy Products, Inc., 12 Cal.App.2d 188, 191
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[55 P.2d 274]; see, also, Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16
Ca1.2d 119, 124 [104 P.2d 1041].)
[6] The board of supervisors, moreover, had no inherent
power to grant the use permit regardless of the terms of the
ordinance. It has long been recognized in this state that a
county board of supervisors performs administrative as
well as legislative functions. (Chinn v. Superior Court, 156
Cal. 478, 481 [105 P. 580].) If the board of supervisors
had power to grant a use permit, it was an administrative
power for the same reason that the granting of permits
is administrative when done by a local board. [6] When
a board of supervisors acts in an administrative capacity,
as in granting permits under a zoning ordinance, it is bound
by the terms of the ordinance until the ordinance is amended
through proper legislative procedure. (See Magruder v.'
City of Redwood, 203 Cal. 665, 675 [265 P. 806) ; Hopkins
v. MacCulloch, 35 Cal.App.2d 442, 452 [95 P.2d 950).)
The action of the Marin County Board of Supervisors in
attempting to grant a use permit contrary to the terms of
the ordinance cannot be considered an amendment to the
ordinance, for by its terms and by the terms of the State
Planning Act under which it was adopted, any amendments
to the master plan must be submitted to the local planningcommission. (Ordinance 264, § 21; State Planning Act, § 9.)
[7] Defendants invoke the rule of contemporaneous and
practical construction of the ordinance to support their contention that the ordinance authorizes the board of supervisors
to issue a use permit after the planning commission has
determined that it should be denied. In 1940, over two
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the board granted
an application for an adjustment after the commission had
denied the application. In 1944, some six years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the board granted an application for a use permit despite the commission's denial of
the application. In neither instance was the action of the
board of supervisors "made at or near the time of the
enactment" of the ordinance. (See 3 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 515.)
Moreover, although contemporaneous construction by officials charged with the administration of a statute or ordinance is given great weight, "final
responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the
courts. 'At most administrative practice is a weight in the
seale, to be considered but not to be inevitably followed.' "

f
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(Whitcomb Hotel v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 753,
756·757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405], quoting from
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F. 2d 973.) The
rule of contemporaneous construction may not be applied
when the wording of the statute or ordinance, as in the
present case, clearly calls for a different construction.
(California Drive·in Restaurant Ass'n. v. CZark, 22 Cal.
2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028].)
IS] Defendants also contend that under the State
Planning Act, the Board of Supervisors of Marin County
had no authority thus to limit its powers over use permits.
It is conceded that the board of supervisors had no authority
to pass an ordinance inconsistent with the State Planning
Act. Whether or not the board might have had authority
pursuant to article XI, section 11, of the California Constitution to provide for some form of zoning plan in the
absence of a state statute on the subject of county zoning
(see Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7 Ca1.2d 384, 391
[60 P.2d 847]; Wertheimer, Constitutionality of Rural
Zoning, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 175, 177), the county board of supervisors could not under this constitutional provision adopt
a zoning ordinance con1licting with state legislation on the
subject. [9] The question arises, therefore, whether the
State Planning 'Act required a board of supervisors to reserve to itself authority to grant a use permit of the type
involved in this case regardless of the decision of the local
planning commission.
Section 6.3 of the State Planning Act authorizes the legislative body of a county, in adopting a master plan or part
thereof, II to determine upon reasonable and practical means
for putting into effect such master plan or part thereof, in
order that the same will serve as a pattern and guide for
the orderly physical growth and development of such . . •
county and as a basis for the efficient expenditure of the
funds thereof relating to the subjects of such master plan.
Such legislative body may adopt and use such procedure as
may be necessary for, this purpose." (Italics added.) This
section clearly authorizes a county board of supervisors to
provide in the county' zoning orllinancc for reasonable and
practical means for putting the master plan into effect.
The ordinance in question provicles that fish reduction plants
lIlay be constructed and operated in "M·2" zones only when
& USe permit therefor is obtained on the approval of an appli-
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cation for such a permit by both the planning commISSIon
and the board of supervisors. It could have provided that
there should be no fish reduction plants in "M-2" zones j
instead, it provides for such plants, if. a proper permit is
obtained. It could have provided that the board of supervisors was free to grant such permits j instead, it requires
approval of both the planning commission and the board
of supervisors for the construction of any fish reduction
plant in "M-2" zones.
Section 20 of the ordinance indicates that this limitation was
adopted to prevent the issuance of use permits that might
"under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety, morals, comfort, convenience, or welfare of persons residing or working in the neighborhood of
such use. . . ." The requirement of affirmative action by both
bodies is certainly a reasonable and practical means of accomplishing this purpose and putting the master plan into effect
under section 6.3 of the State Planning Act. (See, also, § 8
of the State Planning Act.)
The procedure set forth in the ordinance is designed to protect interested citizens and property owners. The requirement that the board of supervisors follow this procedure can'not'bemsregifrdedoiCthe--ground' that 'the- board can modify
the procedure by amending the ordinance. The State Planning
Act prescribes' a definite procedure for amending the localplanning ordinance. It provides for public hearings before the'
local planning commission before adoption of the ordinance
and before any amendments may be made to the ordinance
after its adoption, as a means of protecting interested citizens
and property owners. Before any ordinance is adopted, the
local planning commission must hold public hearings at which
interested parties may appear. (State Planning Act, § 5.) A
proposed plan is then submitted to the local legislative body,
which also holds public hearings. Any change in the proposed
ordinance must be submitted to the commission for additional
public hearings. (Ibid. § 6.)
The board of supervisors does not now have unlimited
powu to make any change in the ordinance. Substantially
the same procedure used in adopting the ordinance must be
followed in making changes. The board has no power to make '
changes until it has submitted them to the commission for .
public hearings, where interested parties may appear and .
present arguments in opposition thereto. (Ibid. § 9.) If the

Dec. 1947]

JOHNSTON 17. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

77

131 C.2d 66; 187 P.2d 6861

board of supervisors, in an administrative capacity, can ignore
the clear provisions of the ordinance, it was idle to prescribe
th(> procedure for amendments.
[10] Defendants contend that the Legislature has provided a specific procedure in section 10 of the state act for the
issuance of use permits and that the ordinance in question is
inconsistent with that section, which provides: "The body
creating such planning commission may, by general or special
rule, provide for the reference of any other matter or class
of matters to the planning commission before final' action
thereon by the public body or officer of said city, county, or
eity and county, having final authority thereon, with the provision that final action shall not be taken until said planning
commission has submitted its report thereon or has had reasonable time, to be fixed in said rule, to submit the report. The
planning commission shall have full power and authority to
make such ijlvestigations, maps and reports, and recommendations in connection therewith relating to the planning and
development of the city, county, or city and county, as it
deems desirable, providing the total expenditures of said board
shall not exceed the funds available therefor." (Italics
added.)
There is nothing in this section that requires the body creating the planning commission to reserve to itself final authority
over such matters as the use permit involved in this case.
It provides the procedure to be followed in certain matters
when final authority thereon is within the jurisdiction of some
body other than the planning commission. The parties disagree as to what matters are referred to by the phrase" Other
matters or class of matters." Defendants contend that it
refers to any action with respect to local zoning other than
amendments to the master plan provided for in the preceding
section (§ 9). Plaintiff, on the other hand, construes the
phrase as referring to matters affecting zoning that are not
otherwise covered in the entire act. Under the latter construction, section 10 would be applicable if a local officer or board
had final jurisdiction over some matter "relating to the planning and development of the . . . county" that was not an
integral part of the zoning plan. It would authorize the
local legislative body to require such officer or board to refer
the matter to the planning commission before taking action.
The last sentence in section 10 lends weight to this construction, for if section 10 refers to the administration of the basic

78
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zoning plan itself, it was unnecessary for tIle Legislature to
provide in this section that the "commission shall have full
power and authority to make such investigations, maps and
reports, and recommendations in connection therewith relating to the planning and development of the city, county, or
city and county, as it deems desirable. . . . " Such powers
are conferred on the commission by section 8 in connection
with its duties in "carrying out" the master plan: "The
commission, and its members, officers and employees in the
performance of their functions, may enter upon any land and
make examinations and surveys. . . . In general the commiSsion shall have such power as may be necessary to enable it to
fulfill its functions and carry out the purposes of this act."
Even if it be assumed, however, that defendants' construction is correct, section 10 would not apply to the use permit
involved in this case. By its terms, the section applies only if
final authority over the action referred to is given to some
body or officer. There is no provision of either state or local
law giving final authority over such use permits to the board
of supervisors when the planning commission has decided
against their issuance. Section 10 does not state that the body
creating the commission must provide. for reference to the
planning commission of any matter involving the administra:
tion of county zoning before final action thereon is taken by
the body creating the planning commission. In order to read
the section as if it contained such a provision it would be
necessary to ignore the words "public body or officer . . •
having final authority thereon." The section obviously applies to action taken by any local public body or officer, and
it applies to a board of supervisors only if that body is the
one having final authority over the matter involved. Moreover, it is circular reasoning to conclude that this section gives
final authority over any matter to any officer or board, for
until the question of the final authority of that body is determined, the question of the applicabiliy of section 10 remains
undetermined.
Defendants rely on a dictum in Hopkins v. MacCuZZoch, 35
Cal.App.2d 442, 450 [95 P.2d 950], involving the effect of:
section 10 on the power of a planning commission over non-·
conforming use permits: "From an interpretation of ....
section 10, supra, when construed with the ordinance adopted
pursuant thereof, it appears to us that the planning commission created 0'11 the ordinance was more or less an advisory
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body. . . . " (Italics added.) The permit involved in that case
was of the nonconforming type under which a property owner
might be allowed to continue a use prohibited by the master
plan, a different type of permit from that involved in the
present case. The ordinance there involved reserved to the
city council the power to grant a nonconforming use perm.it
by unanimous vote when the planning commission decided
against the applicant. Since final authority was thus expressly given the city council, the reference to section 10 of
the State Planning Act was unnecessary. Whether or not
this dictum that a nonconforming use permit is "other matter or class of matters" within the meaning of section 10 is
correct, the section has no application to a provision for use
permits adopted as a method of administering the zoning plan,
when there is no provision giving final authority over such
permits to some local body or officer. Not only is no provision
of the State Planning Act inconsistent with section 19 of the
ordinance in question, but authority for that section is contained in section 6.3 of the state act.
The second ground on which the injunction was sought is
that the action of the board of supervisors, even if authorized
by law is invalid because -of the disqualification of a member
who cast the deciding vo'te. Since the board in any event was
without authority to grant the use permit, it is unnecessary to
decide whether the supervisor in question was disqualified.
[11] Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the operation
of the proposed plant wou1d be offensive and would interfere
with the proper use of his property. Defendants contE'nd
that the injunction is excessive on the ground tha.t these allegations were designed to show a basis for injunctive relicf
regardless of whether or not the interveners obtained a valid
use permit. It is contended that the trial court enjoined the
operation of the plant on the ground that it would be a
nuisance even if authorized under the zoning regulations.
Although plaintiff has argued on appeal that such relief
would be proper, there is nothing in the injunction to indicate that the trial court based its order on this ground. Even
if the allegations with respect to the offensive nature of the
proposed plant can be construed as allegations of a nuisance,
they also form the basis of plaintiff's right to injunctive
relief against the board of supervisors to prevent the issuance
of a use permit contrary to the terms of the ordinance. The
interveners were dismissed as defendants and appear only as
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interveners. There is, therefore, no basis for the contention
that they were enjoined from operating the proposed plant
under a valid permit, for they are not directly enjoined from
doing anything. Since the board of supervisors could not
legally grant interveners application for a use permit, it is
immaterial whether or not the interveners could be enjoined
from operating under a valid permit. (For a collection of
conflicting authorities on this question see note 166 A.L.R.
659; see, also, Civ. Code, § 3482; Norton v. City of Pomona.
5 Ca1.2d 54, 60 [53 P .2d 952).)
The order granting the injunction pendente lite is affirmed
insofar as it restrains the members of the Board of Supervisors
of Marin County from attempting to grant a use permit after
nf'gative action by the Marin County Planning Commission.
That part of the order purporting to restrain the members of
the board of supervisors from taking any action to amend the
local zoning ordinance is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent from all of the judgment of this
court except insofar as it reverses that part of the trial court'8
order which purports to restrain the members of the board of
supervisors from proceeding with the enactment of a regulatory ordinance governing the construction and operation of
reduction plants.
The chief question presented for decision is whether under
the provisions of the State Planning Act (2 Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 5211b) and of Marin County Ordinance No. 264
the Board of Supervisors of Marin County may grant a use
permit despite an adverse recommendation of the county
planning commission. For reasons hereinafter stated, I am of
the opinion that :final authority in such matters rests in the
board, that the recommendation of the planning commission
is advisory only, and that the order of the trial court based
upon a contrary view should be reversed in its entirety.
The majority opinion rests largely, if not completely, as
to this phase of the case upon the declaration that "Section
19 [of Marin County Ordinance 264) thus expressly provides
that no permit shall be granted without the approval of the
planning commission. The board of supervisors is given
power merely to approve or refuse to approve the decision of
the commission approving the application for a permit; the
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board of supervisors is given no authority over the application should the commission deny it." Having asserted such
significance for section 19 of the ordinance, the opinion proceeds to interpret other sections thereof in the "light" of
unquestioning acceptance of, and dependence on, its primary
assertion. If that basic pronouncement falls, so does the whole
discussion.
The obvious vice in the above quoted pronouncement lies
in the fact that section 19, read in its context, does not even
purport to deal with powers of the board of supervisors; it
deals expressly with powers of the planning commission.
Ordinance 264, enacted by the board of supervisors, was not
enacted to create a board of supervisors or to define the powers
of the creating board; it was enacted to create a planning commission and to define the powers of such commission. Manifestly, such ordinance is not intended to constitute a grant
of power to the creating board; rather is it a delegation by the
creating board of certain powers within its authority. A
delegation of authority by a superior to an inferior does not
work a complete divestment of the power of the superior; the
power of the inferior derives from the superior and the latter is the final repository of all the power, with the right to
exercise the same, except as such right may be limited by its
own acts., The ordinance does provide for a planning commission j it does specify the powers delegated to that commission j and it does declare limitations on the authority of the
commission it creates; but nowhere does it declare that the
power of the commission is total or absolute or exclusive or
other than advisory; nowhere does it declare that the board
of supervisors abdicates, or transfers to the commiRsion, the
ultimate power of decision. The language most strongly
relied upon by the majority is (§ 19): "No permit shall be
issued under the provisions of this section [Le., by the planning commission] unless and until a decision of the Planning
Commission, as aforesaid, approving the same, is approved
and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors." (Italics added.)
This stated limitation of power seems to me to be clearly a
limitation upon the commission, not upon its creator, the
board of supervisors. It appears to me to be reasonably
designed to preclude, not to establish basis for, a construction
of the law vesting a totality of power in the commission.
Theories of absolutism in administrative agencies are not
favored in traditional concepts of our ideology and should
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not be invoked by judicial interpolation. (See Roscoe Pound,
"Annual Survey of Law: Decisions of Courts Show Some
Dangerous Trends" (Nov. 1947), 33 Am. Bar Ass'n. Journal
1093.) That it is only by dint of such interpolation that the .
conclusion of the majority can be reached becomes evident
upon consideration of the ordinance as a whole.
Ordinance No. 264 was adopted in 1938, pursuant to the
mandatory provisions of the State Planning Act as amended
in 1937 (Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5211b), and sets up a comprehensive zoning system for the county covering all territory therein outside of incorporated cities and towns. By
its provisions, the county is zoned into various districts, including residential, commercial, and light and heavy industrial, and the uses to which the land lying within the respective districts may be put are specified. Procedures are also
set forth for the application for and granting of adjustments
or variances, and of use permits for the operation of various
types of businesses in certain districts.
By section 11.18 of Ordinance 264 district "M-1," in which
petitioner seeks to establish a iish cannery and reduction
plant, is zoned for "1. Commercial excavating . . . 2. All
other uses not otherwise_prohiJlited_ Qy_l~w.. _except.the follow-_
ing: . . . reduction, canning, processing or treatment of fish
or animal products of any kind . . ." Section 19, whicb_
deals with adjustments, variances, and appeals, provides that
,. The Planning Commission, subject to the approval and confirmation of the Board of Supervisors in each case, as hereinafter provided, shall have power to grant adjustments and
variances in any of the provisions of this ordinance to the
extent of the following and no further: . . .
"Application for any adjustment or variance . . . shall be
made to the Planning Commission in the form of a written
application . . .
"[Following a public hearing] The Commission shall
make its decision on the said application and shall report such
decision to the Board of Supervisors.
"In granting any adjustment or variance under the provisions of this section, the Planning Commission shall designate such conditions in connection therewith as will, in its
opinion, secure substantially the objectives of the regulation
or provision to which such adjustment or variance is granted,
as io light, air, and the public health, safety, comfort, convenience and general welfare. No permit shall be issued un-
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der the provisl:ons of this section 'Unless and until a decision
of the Planning Commission, as aforesaid, approving the
same, is approved and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors . . . . Upon receipt of such report, if the decision of
the Planning Commission approved the granting of the application, the Board of Supervisors either shaU . . . approve and confirm said decision, whereupon the permit as
applied for may issue; or shaU refuse to approve and confirm su.ch decision. . . ." (Italics added.)
Section 20 states that "Use permits may be issued for
any of the following:
"1. Any of the uses or purposes for which such permits
are required or permitted by the provisions of this ordinance.
"Such use permits shall be issued under the same procedure as that specified in Section 19 . . . for the granting
of adjustments or Yariances, except that: . . . 2. The findings of the Planning Commission, except as otherwise provided in this section, need include only that the establishment, maintenance or conducting of the use for which a use
permit is sought will not, under the circumstances of the
particular case, be detrimental to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, convenience, or welfare of persons residing or
working in the neighborhood of such use and will not,
under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to property or
improvements in said neighborhood.
" ... All other provisions of said Section 19, including
the designation by the Planning Commission of any conditions upon which the use permit may be issued and guarantees that such conditions will be complied with, shall
apply to the granting of a use permit."
Sections 9 and 10 of the State Planning Act (Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 5211b), which act concededly is controlling
over the local Marin County ordinance, provide as follows:
" § 9. The legislative body [of a city or county] is authorized and empowered . . . to change or add to the master plan or any part thereof . . . or to change or add to the
official plan or any part thereof. The legislative body shall
first refer the proposed change or addition to the planning
commission for a report thereon. [Public hearings are then
requirpd.] ... Proceedings for any change in . . . the
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master plan or any official plan, or any part thereof, may also
be initiated by the planning commission.
I I § 10. The body creating such planning commission may,
by general or special rule, provide for the reference of any
other matter or class of matters to the planning commission before final action thereon by the public body or
officer of said city, county, or city and county, having final
authority thereon, with the provision that final action thereon shall not be taken until said planning commission has
submitted its report thereon or has had reasonable time, to
be fixed in said rule, to submit the report. . . ."
In support of its position that the board of supervisors
cannot lawfully issue a use permit against the adverse
recommendation of the planning commission, the majority
opinion, as previously indicated, relies upon those portions
of section 19 of Ordinance 264 which state that "No permit
shall be issued . . . unless and until a decision of the Planning Commission, . . . approving the same, is approved and
confirmed by the Board of Supervisors. . . . Upon receipt
of such report [of the decision of the commission], if the
decision of the Planning Commission approved the granting of the application, the Board of Supervisors either
shall . . . approve and confirm said decision, whereuporithe permit as applied for may issue; or shall refuse to approve and confirm such decision." For the reasons hereinafter stated I am convinced that, properly construed, the
quoted provisions of section 19, as adopted into section 20,
grant to the planning commission only the limited power
to consider the merit or lack thereof of each application
for a use permit and to transmit to the board of supervisors
the opinion of the commission thereon; in other words, the
commission is to act as an advisory body but is to have no
power, under the terms of the ordinance, to issue a final
decision either for or against a permit.
By the provisions of section 9 of the State Planning Act
quoted hereinabove, power to "change or add to the master plan or any part thereof . . . or to change or add to the
official plan or any part thereof" is expressly placed in the
legislative bodies of local governmental units-in this instance the Board of Supervisors of Marin County-subject
only to the requirement that the matter first be referred to
the planning commission for a report and that public hearings be had, and by section 10 it is provided that •• The
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body creating such planning commission may.
provide
for the reference of any other matter or class of matters
to the planning commission before final action thereon by
the public body or officer . . . having final authority
thereon, with the provision that final action thereon shall
not be taken until said planning commission has submitted
its report thereon or has had reasonable time . . . to submit
the report. . . ." Whether the granting of a nonconforming use permit be regarded on the one hand as falling under
the "change . . . to the master plan or . . . to the official plan" as described in section 9, or on the other hand
as being one of the "other . . . class of matters" mentioned
in section 10, the statute unequivocally contemplates that the
ultimate decision is in the hands of the local legislative
body. No provision is made that the report of the planning
commission shall carry any other or greater weight than
that which the legislative body may wish to bestow on it.
Nor, I am convinced, was it the intent of the board of
supervisors in adopting Ordinance 264 to irrevocably delegate a controlling power to the planning commission, or
otherwise to so limit the authority primarily vested in the
board as to render them powerless to grant a nonconforming use permit without prior approvlirof -the-commission.
Section 19, which treats of adjustments, variances and
appeals, and which is to be followed generally in the application for and issuance of use permits under section 20, carries
an introductory sentence which, as quoted hereinabove, states
that "The Planning Commission, subject to the approval and
confirmation of the Board of Supervisors in each case, as hereinafter provided, shall have power. . . ." (Italics added.)
It is to be noted that this section contains the delegation of
only a limited power to the commission and that such power is
expressly declared to be "subject to the approval and confirmation of the Board of Supervisors in each case. " Following the qualified grant there appear procedural and other
provisions to be followed by the commission before its decision
and report to the board is made. The subsequent statements,
so heavily relied upon by the majority .opinion, that "No
permit shall be issued under the provisions of this section
unless and until a decision of the Planning Commission, as
aforesaid, approving the same, is approved and confirmed by
the Board of Supervisors. . . . [I]f the decision of the Planning Commission approved the granting of the application,
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the Board of Supervisors either shall . . . approve and confirm said decision, whereupon the permit as applied for may
issue; or shall refuse to approve and confirm such decision. . . .," would seem to be, and it is my view that they
are, inserted as an explicit recognition of the limitation upon
the power of the planning commission and not as creating a
controlling delegation of, or limitation upon, the ultimate
power of the board of supervisors. The section, of course,
contains no grant of power to the board of supervisors becauseall power not granted or delegated is reposed by the basic
state law in the board. mtimate disposition of the matters
dealt with in the sections in question (§§ 19, 20) would, at
least normally, be a function of the board. No provision appears in any portion of the ordinance which expressly declares
that the board shall be bound by a report of the planning
commission adverse to the granting of a nonconforming use
permit, and certainly in accord with accepted legal principles
such a restriction should not be added by judicial interpolation.
The majority opinion relies upon Magruder v. City of Redwood (1928), 203 Cal. 665, 675 [265 P. 806] ; and Hopkins
v. MacCulloch (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 442, 452 [95 P.2d 950]
(see also Schofield v. City of Los An.geles (1932), 120 Cal.
App. 240, 245-246 [7 P.2d 1076]) as authority for the proposition that a board of supervisors is bound by county ordinances. I discover nothing in any of these cases which should
affect the decision here. In the Magruder case it was held
that a city board of trustees which granted a permit to construct a building that was subsequently used for a purpose
in violation of a zoning ordinance did not thereby place
themselves "in a position that prevented them from thereafter
enjorcing the terms of the ordinance." (P. 674 of 203 Cal.)
In Hopkins v. MacCulloch (1939), supra, 35 Cal.App.2d 442,
452, the city council of Newport Beach was held to be without
power to grant a nonconforming use permit by a vote of only
four of its five members, inasmuch as a city ordinance required the "full, affirmative vote of all members thereof."
No such provision is contained in Ordinance No. 264 of
Marin County, nor are analogous requirements set forth.
And contrary to the position taken by the majority opinion
it is noted that those provisions in the Newport Beach
ordinance which dealt with consideration by the planning
commission of nonconforming use permits were held (at
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p. 450 of 35 Cal.App.2d) not to be "a delegation of power
or authority of the city council to the planning commission. " Furthermore, the court there expressly observed
that "From an interpretation of ... section 10 [of the
planning act) . . . when construed with the ordinance
adopted in pursuance thereof, it appears to us that the
planning commission created by the ordinance was more or
less an advisory body only, and its powers must be limited
to its consideration of applications for permits, and to
recommendations for or against the allowance of the permit.
The commission is authorized by the ordinance to hold public hearings on any such application after publication of
notice of hearing, to the end that property owners may
have an opportunity to object to the granting of the permit
on the ground that detriment or injury may result to the
neighborhood. " The same may be appropriately said in
respect to Marin County Ordinance 264.
If there still can remain any doubt as to the proper construction of the oT.linance in question it is resolved by the
fact that in this case we have for our guidance not only the
language of the enactment and the considerations which
have becn mentioned but also evidence establishing the construction placed upon the ordinance as to the precise point
now in dispute by the very legislative body which enacted
it. The ordinance was adopted in 1938. The record shows,
with no dispute, "That with no exception, the Minutes of
the Board of Supervisors show that from August 3rd, 1938,
the date of the passage of said Marin County Planning
Ordinance No. 264, to date, the Marin County Board of
Supervisors has held hearings upon recommendations of
the Marin County Plallning Commission whether the . . .
Commission recommenued approval or denial of the said
applications for Use Permits, Adjustment Permits or Variance Permits;
•• That . . . The Minutes of the Board of Supervisors
show specific instances in which the . . . Planning Commission presented to the Board of Supervisors their recommcndations denying applications for Adjustment Permits
and Use Permits, whereupon the ... Supervisors held a
hearing, reviewed the recommendation of t.he ... Planning
Commission and either approved the recommendation clenying said application or reversed the recommendation of the
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Planning Commission and granted the application for a
Use Permit or an Adjustment . . .
,. That ... the Marin County Board of Supervisors consistently and with no exception, interpreted Section 19 of
. . . Ordinance #264 as never having divested them of the
power to overrule the recommendations of the . . . Planning Commission . . . whether said . . . Planning Commission recommended that said Use Permit be denied or
granted. "
The record contains certified copies of excerpts from
minutes of meetings of the board of supervisors showing
that on 16 different applications (previous to the one in
this case, which is number 17), at meetings held on November 14, 1938, April 10, 1939, November 25, 1940, February
24, 1941, May 26, 1941, October 14, 1941, April 6, 1942,
September 14, 1942, November 9, 1942. November 23, 1942,
April 7, 1943, July 26, 1943, November 8, 1943, November
22, 1943 (two applications), and November 13, 1944, the
board evidenced its construction of the ordinance by proceeding to hear, consider and pass on applications for use
permits or adjustments notwithstanding denial recommendations by the planning commission. There is no suggestion
that the record is incomplete or that in any instance, from the
enactment of the ordinance to the date of this action, the
board deviated from its construction of the ordinance. Thus, .
in every case wherein the point was involved, the legislative
body which drafted and adopted the ordinance construed it
as giving the plannin6! commission investigative and advisory powers only and as leaving in the board the jurisdiction which they exercised.
The majority opinion mentions two instances, other than
in the matter before us, in which the board granted an adjustment or use permit "despite the commission's denial of
the application"; it wholly ignores the 14 othcr instances in
which the board just as clearly evidenced the same construction by considering and passing on the commission's recommendation for denial. The evidence of construction is
equally clear whether the planning commission's recommendation for denial was disapproved or approved. If the
majority opinion is correct, the action of the planning commission recommending denial was not a mere advisory recommendation, it was a final denial and there was nothing for
the board to act on. Yet in every instance it did considel
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the application and the planning commission's recommendation and did take final action for the granting ()r denial of
the application.
This court has repeatedly stated that the construction of
8 statute by the officials charged with its administration must
be given great weight. (Nelson v. Dean (1946), 27 Cal.2d
873, 880 [168 P.2d 16] ; Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. California
Entp. Com. (1944), 24 Cal;2d 753, 756 [151 P.2d 233, 155
A.L.R. 405]; Co-unty of Los Angeles v. Prisbie (1942), 19
Cal.2d 634, 643 [122 P.2d 526J ; Los Angdes County v. Superior Court (1941),17 Cal.2d 707,712 [112 P.2d 10J ; Riley
v. Thompson (1924), 193 Cal. 773, 778 [227 P. 772].) Here
we have contemporaneous and administrative construction
by the very body which enacted the ordinance and such construction has been uniform and unwavering and repeatedly
aeted upon and unequivocally evidenced in a series of proceedings beginning within a few mouths of adoption of the
ordinance and running down to the date of the consistent
action in the matter now before us. My attention has never
been called to a case wherein the elements demanding respect
for contemporaneous and administrative construction are
greater. -- -__________ .
_.
So far as concerns that portion of the injunction order
appealed fro1p._ which restrains the board of supervisors from
proceeding with the adoption of the ordinance to regulate
reduction plants, it is only when such a board is acting in
excess of its jurisdiction that its legislative actions may be interfered with by the courts. (See Glide v. Superior Court
(1905), 147 Cal. 21, 25 [81 P. 225] ; Muchenberger v. City
of Santa Monica (1929), 206 Cal. 635, 646 [275 P. 803];
Reclamation District v. Superior Court (1916), 171 Cal. 672,
681-682 [154 P. 845] ; cf. Brock v. Superior Court (1938),11
Cal.2d 682 [81 P.2d 931]; McKay Jewelers v. Bowron
(1942),19 Ca1.2d 595, 599 [122 P.2d 543, 139 A.L.R. 1188].)
Inasmuch as thp. Legislature has by the State Planning Act
placed in the Board of Supervisors of Marin County final
authority to act on zoning matters in that county, it is apparent that the adoption of regulatory ordinances falls within
such authority. The conditions to be designated by the
planning commission pursuant to sections 19 and 20 of Ordinance 264, should it recommend to the board the granting
of a variance, adjustment, or nonconforming use permit are,
as are' the other recommendations of the commission, advisory
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only, and deprive the board of none of its ultimate power.
Consequently the court below erred in enjoining further
proceedings to complete the enactment of the disputed
ordinance.
And until such an ordinance were adopted and in effect
and appellant Alioto's reduction plant were operating under
its terms, it is difficult to perceive upon what basis the trial
court could conclude, as would be necessary to sustain the
injunction, that, as plaintiff-respondent attempts to plead in his complaint (and as denied in Alioto's answer), such plant
would constitute a nuisance in fact. The parties argue the
point whether a reduction plant operating under a regulatory
ordinance and pursuant to a use permit could . lawfully be
deemed a nuisance in any event (see Civ. Code, § 3482; N orton v.Oity of Pomona (1935),5 Cal.2d 54,59 [53 P.2d 952];
Eaton v. Klimm (1933), 217 Cal. 362, 370 [18 P.2d 678]).
However, in view of the fact that the proposed plant would
be constructed and operated in a district already zoned for
heavy industry, in view of the further fact that the proposed
ordinance does not purport to authorize, and does purport to
forbid, conditions which might amount to a nuisance, and
because other material conditions under which the plaut
would operate cannot be determined at this date, the trial
court does not appear to have been in a position to properly
determine that the plant would constitute a nuisance if and
when operating.
Plaintiff-respondent '. argument that the actions of the
board with respect to both the use permit and the ordinance
were void by reason of the fact that Supervisor Thompson,
who cast one of the three original affirmative votes, is tJ.Je
husband of one of appellant Alioto's attorneys is based upon
contentions that the board in hearing and passing upon an
application for a nonconforming use permit is acting in ft
judicial, or at least quasijudicial, capacity; that the grauting
of such a permit "appears to be a right in the nature of a
grant or franchise" and therefore is a contract; that because
sections 168 and 1il of the Civil Code make a wife's earnings
after marriage liable for necessities of life contracted for by
her husband despite a gift to her from him (as was here made
by Supervisor Thompson to his wife) of his interest in buch
earnings, Supervisor Thompson was necessarily interested
in assisting his wife to successfully represent Alioto and thus,
presumably, to earn a larger fee for her services; and that
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therefore Supervisor Thompson was by reason of public
policy as expressed in various court decisions and of statutory
law as set forth in section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and section 1090 of the Government Code disqualified from
acting in either a quasijudicial capacity or in the making of
a contract by the board of supervisors.
I find no occasion to pass on the question of the asserted
disquali:fication of Mr. Thompson. Such question has become
entirely moot. Since the appeal was taken Mr. Thompson
has ceased to be a member of the board of supervisors. immediately following the vote on the application for the nonconforming use permit and again following that on the proposed ordinance, one of the supervisors who had voted against
both measures gave notice that, under parliamentary rules
of order, he elected to change his vote to the affirmative and
moved for reconsideration of the questions at the next meeting of the board of supervisors. The board then adjourned
to meet again on March 12, 1945, and two days prior to that
date (on March 10, 1945) plaintiff filed his complaint herein.
The status of the application is, therefore, that of a pending
matter before the board of which Mr. Thompson is not a
member. The legal question as to whether Mr. Thompson was
'quali:fied or disql~alified in r~spect to participation in the
original vote does not appear to have any possible effect upon
the validity of the proceedings which must ensue upon the
going down of the remittitur. The motion for reconsideration
will be acted upon by a board of which Mr. Thompson is not
a member and its action will control.
For the reasons above set forth, I would reverse all portions
of the order appealed from.
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
29, 1947. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a
rehearing.

